Buffalo Law Review
Volume 12

Number 1

Article 28

10-1-1962

Criminal Law And Procedure—Contempt Proceedings
Immediately Following Notice Held Sufficient When Conduct in
Grand Jury Room Is Obviously Contemptous
Albert Dolata

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Albert Dolata, Criminal Law And Procedure—Contempt Proceedings Immediately Following Notice Held
Sufficient When Conduct in Grand Jury Room Is Obviously Contemptous, 12 Buff. L. Rev. 126 (1962).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol12/iss1/28

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of his rights. The fact situation should be the controlling factor. This was
recognized by Judge Froessel in his dissent in Meyer where he stated that:
"to hold that admission of a defendant's statements under the particular circumstances of this case constitutes reversible error will not serve the administration of justice."19 Of course, this view may make the determination of the
admissibility of a confession more difficult, but it cannot be alleged that this
should be a controlling factor in a criminal prosecution.
T. C. L.
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NOTICE HELD SUFFICIENT

WHEN CONDUCT IN GRAND JURY ROOm IS OBVIOUSLY CONTEMPTUOUS

Relator was subpoenaed to appear before the Grand Jury in connection
with its investigation of an attempted murder in Brooklyn. He was questioned
about his activities on the afternoon of the assault but refused to answer on the
ground of self-incrimination. In response to this plea, he was granted immunity;
and the questions were repeated. His replies thereafter were evasive and unbelievable. He was willing and able to relate with considerable detail his activities
during the morning and evening hours of that day, but pleaded lack of memory
concerning his activities during the afternoon. Following his testimony before
the Grand Jury, and on the same day, an application was made by the district
attorney to the County Court to have the relator punished for criminal contempt. The proceedings before the Grand Jury were made known to the Judge,
and he ordered the relator to answer the questions or face punishment. Relator
was taken back before the Grand Jury and was once again questioned concerning his activities at the time of the attempted murder. Despite the Judge's
warning that such replies would be regarded as false and treated as deliberate
refusals to answer, the relator answered only that he did not remember. The
district attorney renewed his motion to punish for contempt and the relator
made his second appearance of the day in County Court. A hearing was held
at which the minutes of the Grand Jury proceedings were introduced as evidence for the prosecution. Relator's attorney made repeated requests that he
be given sufficient time (a few days) to prepare a defense and submit a brief.
These requests were denied, and the relator was sentenced to thirty days in
prison and fined $250. On appeal from the Appellate Division's dismissal of
relator's writ of habeas corpus, held, affirmed, one Judge dissenting. In a
conviction under section 750, subdivision 5, of the Judiciary Law, obtained
through proceedings dictated by section 751 of the Judiciary Law, relator was
given a reasonable time to make a defense, although such time was only
momentary, when relator's contemptuous behavior was patently obvious. People
ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of City Prison, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 182 N.E.2d 85, 226
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962).
19. People v. Meyer, supra note 13, at 166, 182 N.E.2d at 10, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
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It is the duty of the courts to prevent disorderly contemptuous behavior
in order to maintain the respect and authority which is their due. The Judiciary
Law specifically enumerates the acts which constitute criminal contempt 1
and provides for the procedure that shall be employed in determining guilt or
innocence.2 If the contempt occurs in the immediate view and presence of the
court, it may be punishable summarily and without proof. If the contempt
occurs outside the presence of the court, then the party charged must be given
sufficient notice of the accusation and a reasonable opportunity to prepare a
defense. 3 What constitutes sufficient notice and reasonable opportunity must
4
be determined in the light of the circumstances of each particular case.
A witness before the Grand Jury cannot evade the statutory command
to testify and subsequent punishment for contempt by the mere rendering of
improbable, contradictory, and obviously evasive answers. 5 When a witness,
after refusing to answer questions before the Grand Jury, has appeared in
court and stated his refusal, and his intention not to answer, this has been
held to be contempt committed within the view and presence of the court. 6
In the case of the witness who repeats his refusal to testify before the Grand
Jury within the hearing of the presiding judge, it is the second refusal which
constitutes the act of contempt which may be summarily punished. However,
if the acts are committed outside of the sight of the presiding judge, so that he
cannot assert of his own knowledge that the acts were contemptuous, they must
be examined at a hearing after the defendant has had fair opportunity to pre7
pare his defense.
The Court of Appeals viewed the conduct of the relator as behavior that
might well have been treated as contempt committed within the view and
presence of the court, because the relator so plainly and clearly refused to
answer after being ordered by the judge to do so. However, his behavior was
not so treated; instead, the court acted only upon the evasive tactics employed
by the relator during his appearances before the Grand Jury. The issue actually
presented to the Court of Appeals was whether the hearing afforded the defendant on this matter was fair and whether the opportunity to prepare a
defense was sufficient under all of the circumstances. Though the relator's
attorney asked the County Court for time to study the minutes of the Grand
Jury and to prepare a defense, the County Court denied this request and the
Court of Appeals held that "there was little need for study or deliberation in
face of what was so plain a case." The majority decided that the relator was
1. Douglas v. Adel, 269 N.Y. 144, 145, 199 N.E. 35, 36 (1935).
2. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 750.
3. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 751.
4. People ex rel. Barnes v. Court of Sessions, 147 N.Y. 290, 41 N.E. 700 (1895).
5. Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 22 N.E.2d 360 (1939).
6. Matter of Kamell, 170 Misc. 868, 11 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1939).
7. People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74, 21 How. Pr. (1861); Costello v.
Schurman, 6 Misc. 2d 66, 163 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1957); People v. Costello, 6 A.D.2d
385, 178 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 761, 159 N.E.2d 205, 186 N.Y.S.2d
660 (1959).
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afforded reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense and his hearing was a
fair one. The dissent objected that the proceedings did not meet the requirements of section 751 of the Judiciary Law and amounted to a deprivation of
8
relator's basic constitutional right to a fair hearing.
The purpose of the statutory requirements is that an accused be given
notice of the accusation of contempt and a reasonable time to make a defense.9
The Court of Appeals has approved the precipitate haste with which the relator
was accused and convicted of contempt in one afternoon. The Court based
its decision on Spector v. Allen,'0 but in that case the time allowed was greater,
and more importantly, there were no requests for greater time to prepare a
defense. The Court here believed that allowing the relator more time would
simply have opened the door to mere technical objections and that no feasible
defense on the merits was possible. It is true that the facts of the case permit
little doubt that the relator's answers were deliberately evasive, and it is also
true that if these answers were given in the presence and view of the court,
that the relator would have had no right to a hearing, but the answers were
not given in the presence of the court, and should not be treated as if they were.
The provision for summary punishment for contemptuous acts committed in
the presence of the court might indicate that the provisions for hearing and
defense for acts committed outside of its presence are for the purpose of contesting the factual occurrences only. Since in the case of direct contempt there
is no opportunity to voice legal objections, it would seem that the only difference between direct contempt and contempt committed outside of the court
is the judge's certainty of the factual occurrences. In cases where the witness has
repeated his refusal to answer in the presence of the judge, he has been
summarily punished. The dicta of the Court of Appeals in this case would
indicate that an express refusal is not necessary but that a position amounting
to refusal (deliberate flouting of the judge's express mandate to answer
candidly questions asked before the -Grand Jury) may be sufficient. This
dicta, may well be the most important aspect of the case, since it points toward
a broadening of the kind of behavior which will be regarded as direct contempt. The cases relied upon by the majority, as authority for their opinion that
the conduct of the relator might have been treated as direct contempt, involved express refusal to answer, while relator's conduct in the instant case
only amounted to refusal to answer. It is possible that the majority allowed
their strong belief that the relator's conduct within the view and presence of
the court amounted to direct contempt, to influence their judgment regarding
the adequacy of the hearing afforded relator on the charge of contempt committed outside the court. The fact that the relator might have been guilty
8. Douglas v. Adel, supra note 1.
9. People ex rel. Roache v. Hanbury, 162 App. Div. 337, 342, 147 N.Y. Supp. 851, 855
(2d Dep't 1914).
10. Spector v. Allen, supra note 5.
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of contempt within the view and presence of the court is no reason to lower the
standard of procedure applied to determine his guilt of committing contemptuous
acts outside of the view and presence of the court. The argument that relator's conduct outside the view and presence of the court was "plainly" contemptuous does not appear to be an adequate reason not to allow him at least
some time to prepare his defense.
A. D.
CoiAi

NOBIs ALLOWED UPON ALLEGATION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF GuILTY

PLEA VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS

In 1943 a thirteen-year-old boy entered a plea of guilty to the crime of
murder in the second degree. At the time of the plea there were before the court
the statements of three psychiatrists, given in a conference prior to acceptance
of the plea, to the effect that the boy was legally sane. A fourth psychiatrist
informed the judge at that time that it was his opinion that the accused was
suffering from an epileptic attack during commission of the act and that such
an attack would have rendered anyone incapable of remembering the acts
committed in the course of seizure. The day following the conference the court
accepted the boy's plea. The convicted boy suffered a number of attacks of the
grand mal type, as well as numerous lesser attacks, subsequent to his imprisonment. He brought a petition for a writ in the nature of coram nobis
alleging that under the circumstances of his youth and epileptic condition
his plea of guilty was neither effective nor voluntary, but was violative of
due process of law. The trial court denied the petitioner a hearing on the
allegations. On appeal, held, reversed. The taking of such a plea required an
"extreme measure of caution and at least a certainty of guilty and of the complete absence of any plausible defense . . ." in view of the petitioner's youth
and epileptic condition. People v. Codarre, 10 N.Y.2d 361, 179 N.E.2d 475,
223 N.Y'S.2d 457 (1961).
The writ of error coram nobis originated in the Chancery Court and was
directed to the court of original jurisdiction to correct judgments resulting
from errors of fact. The writ lay dormant in New York until the Court of
Appeals gave it new life in 1943. The Court held that the right to hear a
motion to vacate a judgment of conviction was within the inherent power
of the court, as was exercised in common law criminal cases "through the writ
of error coram nobis."' In a subsequent case a petitioner was denied the right
2
to appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction.
The Legislature remedied this situation by permitting an appeal from an order
denying 3 or granting 4 a motion for a writ of coram nobis. This was the first
statutory recognition of coram nobis in New York.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427 (1945).
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 517.
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 518.

